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‘In all our plans for the future, we are 
re-defining and we are re-stating our 
Socialism in terms of the scientific 
revolution. But that revolution 
cannot become a reality unless we 
are prepared to make far-reaching 
changes in economic and social 
attitudes which permeate our whole 
system of society. The Britain that is 
going to be forged in the white heat 
of this revolution will be no place for 
restrictive practices or for outdated 
methods on either side of industry.’
The quote is from Harold Wilson’s 
speech to the Labour Party 
conference on 1 October 1963. It 
was his first speech to conference 
since becoming party leader upon the death of Hugh 
Gaitskell. A year later he would find himself in 10 
Downing Street. The ‘white heat’ speech came to 
be seen as the very essence of Wilson’s ideological 
renewal: a brave new world where talent and hard 
work would be rewarded and where British society 
would break with old class barriers in a giant leap towards modernisation.In the standard view Wilson distanced him from the 
traditional working-class collectivism of the left as 
well as attacking the traditionalism and inherited 
privileges of the right. His 
was a voice speaking to the rising middle class, in favour of rational organisation of 
society and progress through 
scientific improvement. 
Wilson’s reputation as 
prime minister hinges to a large extent on whether he 
managed both to reorient the 
Labour Party towards this new middle class and whether he did manage to modernise the British economy. 
The speech was much more interesting than this analysis suggests, though it is hard to see this. It is full of ludicrous 
analyses of the potential of technical change. In his 
speech Wilson claimed that 
‘the essence of modern 
automation is that it replaces the hitherto unique human 
functions of memory and of judgment’; computers 
now commanded ‘facilities of memory and of 
judgment far beyond the capacity of any human 
being or groups of human beings who have ever 
lived’. As a result, the ‘programme-controlled 
machine tool line’ could ‘without the intervention of 
any human agency’ produce a ‘new set of machine 
tools in its own image’; they had acquired ‘the 
faculty of unassisted reproduction’. 
This argument was hardly original; rather it 
is a recurring one throughout a post-war era 
of technological change. Thus, rather than 
showing a particularly prescient political leader, it demonstrates that when it comes to those 
elusive and confusing notions of ”science” and 
”technology”, intelligent people spoke much the 
same nonsense they do today. Rubbishy techno-
futurism encapsulated in brain-rotting cliches is 
still the way elites want us to think about these 
matters. It appeals to cynical politicians too – it 
suggests the past or present are no guide, we must 
move on, wipe our minds of what we know, ready for 
the brave new world of the future. In British politics 
techno-futurism has been the refuge of scoundrels. 
Wilson’s speech was in part that of a cunning 
political operator, exploiting techno-futurism in 
just this way. It is why it has been recommended to 
more recent Labour leaders. 
But it also appeals because 
it is believed that Wilson 
put his finger on something 
vitally important that 
remains true today – that the 
British elite are speculators, 
financiers, aristocrats, hostile to the modern necessities 
of research, development, industrial modernisation. It is an argument that has 
been prevalent in criticism 
of Britain’s economic decline 
from the Great War onwards, 
and it is a line that finds 
particular resonance on the 
left. From this perspective, 
class constrains talent; 
inherited privilege and outdated British institutions 
are a break on progress and social justice all at once, not 
least by restricting research 
and development (R&D.
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A new era? Wilson presented his case as one of political, 
social and industrial renewal.
It is a position that could easily yield a conclusion that if Wilson 
failed to deliver, it was because the 
policies he adopted were simply 
not up to the task.  Supporting 
research and development, 
waxing ecstatic about computers, 
expanding scientific education 
was never going to be enough.
But Wilson knew very well what 
the scientific intellectuals and 
other propagandists did not 
wish to be frank about: that the 
British state was by far the world’s 
biggest investor in research and 
development other than the US and 
the USSR. He wanted to redirect 
this effort: as he put it, Labour 
would be ‘mobilising Britain’s 
scientific wealth for the task of creating, not the means of human 
destruction, but the munitions of 
peace’. 
Yes, he wanted more scientists, and endorsed the 
myth there were not enough, but he campaigned 
against the so-called independent, so-called British, 
so-called deterrent and the overemployment of 
scientists on ‘prestige’ military projects that never 
got off the drawing board. In other words he wanted 
to reform the British state, not by putting science 
and technology into it, but by redirecting its already 
massive technical effort, most of which was tied up 
in over-inflated British warfare state. 
The ‘white heat’ speech also embraced another 
radical policy – hostility to the common market. 
Many Labour people were hostile to the rampant 
consumerism of the affluent society, and supportive 
of the poor of the world, particularly in the 
Commonwealth. Wilson pressed these buttons 
hard. What was needed, he said, was an ‘increase in 
Britain’s productive power’, not ‘some new gimmick 
or additive to some consumer product’ which 
television adverts would ‘tell us all to buy a little 
more of’ when ‘we did not even know we wanted [it] 
in the first place’. Here is, clearly, a break from the 
easy idealisation of increased consumption that had characterised the long 1950s.It was very nice, Wilson said, to do research on 
colour television and bigger and better washing 
machines to sell in Dusseldorf, but instead ‘we 
should be mass producing simple ploughs and 
tractors’, and researching ‘one or two horsepower 
steam engines, because that is what the world 
needs’. The scientific departments of the new 
universities should be working on 
plant breeding, fertiliser, animal 
husbandry for the poor world, 
which should be supplied with 
transport equipment by otherwise 
redundant railway workshops. 
How did the promises fare? Wilson was to shed most of the 
commitments above: the US 
Polaris missiles were bought and 
put into semi-British submarines; Britain sought entry to the 
Common Market once more, and 
there was no mass production of 
steam ploughs for the poor of the Commonwealth. But there were 
important novelties in research 
policy, the most important and 
the least understood being the 
use of military-style procurement 
for civil projects under a new and vast industry, energy and 
defence procurement ministry called the Ministry of 
Technology. Wilson was long committed to creating 
such a ministry, and it was no gimmick. But the 
ministry quickly realised that the problem with 
the British economy was not the lack of R&D, or 
scientists, but something else, perhaps investment, or management. In other words, it realised that the 
techno-declinist theses that helped launch it were 
untenable. In other words, key theses which Wilson 
espoused, and many analysts then and now espouse, were, the government realised, wrong. 
The ‘white heat’ was not a failed attempt to insert 
technocracy into British politics; it was rather an 
only partially successful attempt to redirect an existing technocratic state. On that score, the Wilson 
government met with a broad set of challenges that 
should not be reduced to inherited institutions and 
class but encompassed issues such as the dynamic 
between public and private sector and Britain’s 
position in the world. 
Alas, the speech is remembered, worse, celebrated, 
for its banalities and not its substance, and what 
Labour learned in office was consigned to the deep 
darkness where the truth about research policy 
is hidden. ’White heat’ has become one of those 
pernicious clichés like the ‘two cultures’. Where 
’white heat’  denotes government-inspired industrial 
modernisation, the ’two cultures’ depict a counter-
productive emphasis on the arts rather than natural sciences in British higher education. Both are 
clichés that have corrupted our understanding of 
the operation of knowledge and power in modern 
Britain. We need to stop using them and begin, at 
long last, to think freely from them.13
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Stop-go-economy. Growth rates in Britain 
during the 1950s and 60s, based on numbers 
from the Office for National Statistics.
